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A WARNING WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS: FIRST AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES TO THE FDA’S GRAPHIC WARNING LABEL 
REQUIREMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Every day, 3800 young Americans under the age of eighteen smoke their 
first cigarette.1 One-fourth of high school seniors are regular smokers.2 
Cigarette smoking continues to be the leading cause of preventable death in the 
United States, accounting for approximately one out of every five deaths each 
year.3 More than eighty percent of regular smokers have their first cigarette 
before turning eighteen.4 
These disturbing statistics, published in the most recent Surgeon General’s 
report,5 demonstrate the imminent need for government action. In 2009, 
Congress introduced the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
(the Act) to give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to 
regulate tobacco products.6 One of the most aggressive anti-smoking 
provisions of the Act requires new warning labels consisting of graphic images 
to take up fifty percent of cigarette packages.7 
Like all past tobacco warning label requirements, this latest legislation has 
encountered much opposition from tobacco companies. Immediately after the 
Act was signed into law, six tobacco companies filed suit against the 
government challenging the constitutionality of several provisions, including 
the graphic images.8 Two years later, after the FDA released the nine specific 
required images,9 five tobacco companies again filed suit challenging the 
 
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG 
YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL iii (2012) [hereinafter 
PREVENTING TOBACCO USE]. 
 2. Id. at 135. 
 3. Id. at i. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009). 
 7. Id. § 201(a), 123 Stat. at 1843. 
 8. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 520–21 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 9. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,628 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141 (2012)) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
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specific images under the First Amendment.10 The suits have resulted in a 
circuit split, with the Sixth Circuit upholding the graphic warnings as 
constitutional11 and the D.C. Circuit striking them down as violating the First 
Amendment.12 
Part I of this Note discusses the historical background of tobacco warning 
regulation in the United States. Part II explains the key provisions of the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. Part III analyzes the 
differences between the Sixth and D.C. Circuits’ contradicting rulings on First 
Amendment challenges to the Act. Part IV suggests how the circuit split might 
be resolved using the intermediate scrutiny standard applied by the D.C. 
Circuit to reach the same conclusion as the Sixth Circuit in upholding the new 
warning requirements as constitutional. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Overview of Tobacco Warning Regulations 
Congress first required warnings on tobacco products in 1965 in response 
to the landmark 1964 Surgeon General report Smoking and Health: Report of 
the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service.13 
This was the Surgeon General’s first report highlighting the deleterious health 
consequences of smoking and declaring a causal relationship between smoking 
and lung cancer.14 The report also found smokers to have a seventy percent 
higher mortality rate and established a high correlation between smoking, 
emphysema, and heart disease.15 The report resulted in a wave of public 
concern; however, it did not set forth any specific policy recommendations.16 
Within a week of its publication, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
proposed a rule requiring health warnings to be printed on cigarette packages.17 
In the face of inevitable regulation, tobacco companies turned to the tobacco-
friendly members of Congress to encourage legislative action.18 
 
 10. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
 11. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569. 
 12. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222. 
 13. John Parascandola, Warning Labels, in TOBACCO IN HISTORY AND CULTURE: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 675, 675 (Jordan Goodman ed., 2004). 
 14. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 31–37 
(1964). 
 15. Id. at 32–38. 
 16. Parascandola, supra note 13. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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Congress responded quickly by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling 
and Advertising Act of 1965 (the 1965 Act) requiring cigarette packages to 
bear the warning, “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your 
Health.”19 Although the 1965 Act first introduced the warning label 
requirement, it was also heavily protective of the tobacco industry by 
prohibiting both the FTC and state and local governments from requiring any 
stronger warning labels on packages or in advertisements until at least 1969.20 
The New York Times categorized the 1965 Act as “a shocking piece of special 
interest legislation . . . a bill to protect the economic health of the tobacco 
industry by freeing it of proper regulation.”21 
The weak warning was eventually strengthened by the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (the 1969 Act), which changed the required 
label to, “Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette 
Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.”22 The legislation also prohibited 
television and radio cigarette advertisements.23 Although the 1969 Act 
strengthened the previous warning, it was still heavily influenced by the 
interests of the tobacco industry.24 Before the passage of the 1969 Act, tobacco 
companies successfully defeated an effort to add references to lung cancer and 
other diseases in favor of the extremely vague warning.25 
It was not until the passage of the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act 
of 1984 (the 1984 Act) that warnings became more specific and informative.26 
The 1984 Act created a rotational warning system still in use today that 
requires both cigarette packages and advertisements to rotate four different 
warnings every three months.27 The warnings link cigarette smoking to specific 
adverse health effects such as lung cancer, emphysema, heart disease, and 
pregnancy complications.28 While the 1984 Act made huge improvements to 
the previous vague warnings, these outdated warnings are still in use today.29 
Although the United States was the first country to require warning labels 
on cigarette packages, it now requires one of the smallest, least prominent 
 
 19. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282, 
283 (1965). 
 20. Id. at 282–83. 
 21. Editorial, Cigarettes vs. F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1965, at 28. 
 22. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970). 
 23. Id. § 6, 84 Stat. at 89. 
 24. Parascandola, supra note 13, at 675–76. 
 25. Id. at 676. 
 26. Comprehensive Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984). 
 27. Id. § 4(a), 98 Stat. at 2203. 
 28. Id. § 4(a), 98 Stat. at 2202. 
 29. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
NATION app. C at 2 (2007) [hereinafter ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
246 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:243 
warnings compared to other countries.30 It is also one of the few countries left 
in the developed world that has not updated its warnings in nearly thirty 
years.31 Textual warnings are currently placed along one of the sides of 
cigarette packages, using small typeface and similar colors to the rest of the 
packaging.32 Canada, in contrast, requires one of sixteen different graphic 
warnings to take up at least fifty percent of the visible surface of cigarette 
packages.33 Each of the sixteen different warnings is accompanied by a brief 
explanation, such as statistical support for that warning, along with a picture 
illustrating that particular warning.34 In 2001, Canada became the first country 
to require graphic warnings on cigarette packages, and since then at least sixty-
two other countries have followed suit including Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Brazil, and Switzerland.35 
B. Decades of Deceit Uncovered 
The facts in United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.36 highlight the 
magnitude of deceit by tobacco companies. In 1999, the United States filed a 
lawsuit against nine cigarette manufacturers and two tobacco-related trade 
organizations created by the tobacco companies.37 The complaint alleged that 
the defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) by participating in a “decades-long conspiracy” to deceive the 
American public about the health risks and addictiveness of smoking 
cigarettes.38 Specifically, the conspiracy involved (1) denying the serious 
health risks associated with smoking and second-hand smoke, (2) denying the 
addictiveness of cigarettes, and, in fact, manipulating cigarettes to be even 
more addicting, (3) intentionally marketing to youth, and (4) concealing 
evidence to cover up the dangers of smoking.39 
After five years of discovery, nine months of trial, and around 14,000 
exhibits,40 the district court issued a 987-page opinion that chronicled decades 
of deceit by tobacco companies and ultimately found the defendants liable for 
their conspiracy to defraud the American public about the dangers of 
 
 30. Id. app. C at 2–3. 
 31. Id. app. C at 2. 
 32. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 69,529. 
 33. ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM, supra note 29, at 291–92. 
 34. Id. 
 35. CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS: 
INTERNATIONAL STATUS REPORT 2–3 (3d ed. 2012); ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM, supra 
note 29, at 291. 
 36. 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 37. Id. at 1105. 
 38. Id. at 1105–06. 
 39. Id. at 1106. 
 40. Id. 
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smoking.41 The court noted that for approximately fifty years, each of the 
defendants “repeatedly, consistently, vigorously—and falsely—denied the 
existence of any adverse health effects from smoking” despite their “massive” 
internal documentation confirming these health effects.42 The court further 
found that in response to the scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes 
lung cancer, the defendants launched “a campaign . . . designed to mislead the 
public about the health consequences of smoking” in order to maximize 
corporate profits.43 
The defendants appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit, and the three-
judge panel unanimously upheld the district court’s decision that found the 
defendants liable.44 The court also upheld a majority of the district court’s 
ordered remedies, including an injunctive order requiring the defendants to 
issue corrective statements concerning the topics about which they had 
previously deceived consumers.45 The defendants were required to publish the 
statements in cigarette package inserts, retail displays, newspapers, on 
television, and on their company websites.46 The court rejected the defendants’ 
arguments that the corrective statement requirements violated the First 
Amendment and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.47 
II.  THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 
President Barack Obama signed the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act into law on June 22, 2009.48 The Act was introduced in 
part to give the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products in response to 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., which held that Congress had not given the FDA such authority.49 The 
stated purpose of the Act is to provide the FDA with regulating authority in 
order to “address issues of particular concern to public health officials, 
especially the use of tobacco by young people and dependence on tobacco.”50 
One of the most notable and controversial provisions includes a 
requirement for new health warnings consisting of color graphics to illustrate 
the dangers of smoking.51 The warnings are required to cover fifty percent of 
 
 41. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 42. Id. at 208. 
 43. Id. at 187–88. 
 44. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1105. 
 45. Id. at 1138–45. 
 46. Id. at 1138. 
 47. Id. at 1140–45. 
 48. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009). 
 49. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). 
 50. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 3(2), 123 Stat. at 1781. 
 51. Id. § 201(d), 123 Stat. at 1845. 
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the front and back of cigarette packages.52 In addition, the Act limits the 
advertising of tobacco products to minors,53 prohibits the sale of flavored 
cigarettes,54 and requires tobacco companies to reveal all product ingredients 
and seek FDA approval for any new tobacco products.55 
In promulgating the Act, Congress included several legislative findings to 
support its conclusion that tobacco use by adolescents is an issue “of particular 
concern to public health officials.”56 Such findings include that almost all new 
users of tobacco products are under the legal age to purchase such products,57 
past efforts to restrict marketing have failed to adequately curb tobacco use 
among children,58 and that children are more influenced by tobacco than 
adults.59 
In June 2011, the FDA released nine color graphics to illustrate 
accompanying textual warnings that would be required to appear on every 
cigarette package.60 The FDA chose the nine images from thirty-six proposed 
images after considering approximately 1700 public comments and results 
from its 18,000-person study of the effectiveness of the warnings.61 The study 
was an internet-based consumer study examining the relative effectiveness of 
the warnings at communicating the dangers of smoking to three target groups: 
adults aged twenty-five and over, young adults aged eighteen to twenty-five, 
and youth aged thirteen to seventeen who currently smoke or are susceptible to 
smoking.62 Each group viewed a hypothetical cigarette package containing one 
of the thirty-six graphic images, while the control group viewed a package with 
no graphic images.63 The study then examined the emotional and cognitive 
responses of each participant and measured each participant’s ability to recall 
the content of the warning.64 The FDA stated that in selecting the nine images, 
it considered all outcomes, but gave most weight to the “salience measures”—
 
 52. Id. § 205(d), 123 Stat. at 1848–49. 
 53. Id. § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1831. 
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1) (2012). 
 55. Id. § 387j. 
 56. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 2, 123 Stat. at 1776–81; Id. § 
3(2), 123 Stat. at 1781. 
 57. Id. § 2(4), 123 Stat. at 1777. 
 58. Id. § 2(6), 123 Stat. at 1777. 
 59. Id. § 2(23), 123 Stat. at 1778. 
 60. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,628. The implementation date of the new warnings was 
originally scheduled for September 2012, but is now uncertain due to the current litigation. 
Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/ 
TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/default.htm (last visited May, 22, 
2013). 
 61. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,629, 36,637–38. 
 62. Id. at 36,367. 
 63. Id. at 36,638. 
 64. Id. 
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that is, the participants’ cognitive and emotional responses.65 In support of this 
methodology, the FDA cited research suggesting that “risk information is most 
readily communicated by messages that arouse emotional reactions.”66 
The selected images and textual warnings include: a body on an autopsy 
table to illustrate the warning, “Smoking can kill you,” a man blowing smoke 
out of the tracheotomy hole in his throat to accompany the warning, 
“Cigarettes are addictive,” a man smoking while holding a baby to accompany 
the warning, “Tobacco smoke can harm your children,” a cartoon image of a 
baby in an incubator to depict the warning, “Smoking during pregnancy can 
harm your baby,” side-by-side images of a diseased and healthy lung to 
accompany the warning, “Smoking can cause fatal lung disease,” a patient 
wearing an oxygen mask to accompany the warning, “Cigarettes cause strokes 
and heart disease,” a man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt to illustrate the warning, 
“Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health,” a woman 
crying to accompany the warning, “Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in 
nonsmokers,” and a close-up image of mouth cancer lesions to illustrate, 
“Cigarettes cause cancer.”67 Each graphic warning also includes the tobacco 
quit line number, “1-800-QUIT-NOW.”68 
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Sixth Circuit Upholds Warnings in Discount Tobacco 
On August 31, 2009, in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United 
States, a group of tobacco manufacturers and retailers brought suit against the 
United States, challenging the constitutionality of the Act.69 Specifically, the 
companies challenged five provisions, including (1) the new requirements for 
graphic warning labels, (2) restrictions on the commercial marketing of 
modified risk tobacco products, (3) the prohibition on statements implicitly or 
explicitly conveying an impression that tobacco products are approved by the 
FDA, (4) the prohibition of color and graphics in tobacco advertisements, and 
(5) the prohibition on the distribution of free samples or on sponsorship at 
events.70 In particular, the plaintiffs contended that the mandated graphic 
warnings violated the First Amendment right to free speech.71 Because the 
 
 65. Id. at 36,638–39. 
 66. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,639. 
 67. Id. at 36,649–57, 36,696; see also Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 60. 
 68. Final Rule, supra note 9, at 36,674; see also Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 60. 
 69. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 521 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 70. Id. at 520. 
 71. Id. at 524. 
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specific required images had not yet been released at the time the complaint 
was filed, the plaintiffs made a facial challenge to the overall requirement.72 
The district court granted summary judgment to the United States on the 
challenges to the graphic warnings, along with the challenges to the restrictions 
on the marketing of modified risk tobacco products and the prohibition on 
sponsorship and distribution of free samples.73 In contrast, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the other two challenges.74 Both 
parties appealed.75 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Act’s 
warning label requirements, with Judge Clay dissenting on the constitutionality 
of the graphic images.76 The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the Act’s restriction of tobacco 
advertising to black and white text and its upholding of the Act’s restriction on 
marketing of modified-risk tobacco products and ban on sponsorship and free 
sampling at events.77 The court reversed the district court’s holding regarding 
the other two provisions.78 
1. Application of the Zauderer Rational-Basis Standard 
In affirming the constitutionality of the Act’s new graphic warning 
requirements, all three judges agreed that the proper level of scrutiny was the 
rational-basis standard set forth in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
of Supreme Court of Ohio.79 
In Zauderer, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an 
Ohio rule requiring attorneys who advertised contingency-fee services to 
disclose in their advertisements that a losing client might still be responsible 
for certain litigation fees.80 The Court reasoned that because the extension of 
the First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified primarily by 
protecting the flow of accurate information to the consumer, the commercial 
speaker’s interest in not providing particular factual information is minimal.81 
Thus, the standard for upholding required disclosures of factual information is 
 
 72. Id. at 553. 
 73. Id. at 521. 
 74. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 521. 
 75. Id. at 518. 
 76. Id. at 551. 
 77. Id. at 518. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 554, 558 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (majority opinion)). 
 80. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 653 n.15. 
 81. Id. at 651. 
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lower than the standard for upholding outright prohibitions on commercial 
speech.82 
Under the Zauderer rational-basis standard, disclosure requirements do not 
violate the First Amendment so long as the requirement is reasonably related to 
the government’s interest in preventing deception to consumers.83 In order for 
Zauderer to apply, the required disclosure must involve purely factual 
information and must be aimed at preventing consumer deception.84 
The court in Discount Tobacco rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
government must survive strict scrutiny.85 The plaintiffs relied on 
Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, in which the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invalidated an Illinois law requiring 
video game retailers to place the label “18” on any game deemed to be 
“sexually explicit,” thereby prohibiting the sale of that game to minors.86 
There, the court applied strict scrutiny, reasoning that the labeling of a game as 
“sexually explicit” constituted a “subjective and highly controversial 
message.”87 The plaintiffs asserted that here, the government is similarly 
attempting to convert tobacco companies into “its mouthpiece for a subjective 
and highly controversial marketing campaign expressing its disapproval of 
their lawful products.”88 
Although all three judges agreed that the warnings in this case are 
distinguishable from the label in Blagojevich, they based this distinction on 
different grounds. Judge Stranch, writing for the majority, distinguished this 
case from Blagojevich on the ground that the required disclosures in this case 
involve factual information.89 The majority noted that whether a particular 
video is “sexually explicit” is necessarily based on opinion stemming from 
one’s own personal taste and morals.90 Thus, the required warning in 
Blagojevich would force video game manufacturers to communicate the 
government’s opinion that a game is sexually explicit.91 The graphic warnings 
at issue in this case, however, provide undisputed factual information 
regarding the health risks of smoking.92 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 522, 527 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 86. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. at 561. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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Judge Clay, writing for the dissent, agreed that the textual warnings 
contained purely factual warnings not subject to the strict scrutiny standard.93 
But unlike the majority, he asserted that there could be “no doubt” that the 
graphic images are subjective based on their inherently persuasive nature.94 He 
further noted that the visual images could not be categorized as “mere health 
disclosure warnings” and thus the plaintiffs’ argument for strict scrutiny was 
“not wholly unpersuasive.”95 In contrast to the majority’s distinction between 
factual and subjective information, Judge Clay based his distinction on the 
extent of the restrictions imposed by each required disclosure.96 In 
Blagojevich, the warning required on video games deemed to be “sexually 
explicit” was not simply a warning, but also carried an affirmative limitation 
on speech in the form of a sales restriction.97 Conversely, the graphic warnings 
in this case serve only as disclaimers and carry no affirmative limitation on 
speech.98 
2. Analysis Under the Zauderer Standard 
Under Zauderer’s rational-basis standard, the only question left for the 
court was whether there existed a rational connection between the purpose of 
the new warnings and the means used to achieve that purpose.99 The stated 
purpose of the Act overall is to “address issues of particular concern to public 
health officials, especially the use of tobacco by young people and dependence 
on tobacco.”100 The purpose of the new warning requirements in particular is to 
promote a greater understanding of the health risks associated with smoking.101 
In finding that the new warning requirements are in fact reasonably related 
to preventing consumer deception, the majority first pointed to the historical 
deception of tobacco companies about the health risks associated with 
smoking.102 The court cited to United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.103 to 
highlight the “decades-long” conspiracy by tobacco companies to mislead 
 
 93. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 527 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 526. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 526–27. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 527 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 561 (majority opinion). 
 100. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3(2), 123 
Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009). 
 101. See id. § 202(b), 123 Stat. 1845–46 (authorizing the FDA to adjust the formatting of the 
label requirements if necessary to “promote greater public understanding of the risks associated 
with the use of tobacco products.”). 
 102. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562. 
 103. Id. (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam)). 
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consumers about the health risks of smoking.104 Thus, the court essentially 
equated “preventing deception” to “balancing past deception.” 
The majority next asserted that the existing warnings do not effectively 
combat this deception for two primary reasons. First, the warnings are not 
prominent enough, and are thus easily overlooked.105 The existing warnings 
are printed along the side of cigarette packages and take up less than five 
percent of the package surface.106 The court pointed to both the 1994 Report of 
the Surgeon General and a 2007 Institute of Medicine report concluding that 
the warnings go largely unnoticed by viewers and fail to convey relevant 
information in an effective way.107 A second major problem with the current 
warnings, as the court pointed out, is the fact that in order for viewers to 
understand the warning, they must have a relatively high reading level.108 This 
is especially problematic considering that the Act intends to prevent smoking 
among youth.109 In the absence of more effective and attention-capturing 
warnings, youths especially fail to fully understand the dangers of smoking.110 
The court found that given these ineffective warnings, people do not fully 
understand the dangers of tobacco use.111 The court cited the district court’s 
opinion in Philip Morris, in which the court found that “[m]ost people do not 
have a complete understanding of the many serious diseases caused by 
smoking, the true nature of addiction, or what it would be like to experience 
either those diseases or addiction itself. Rather, most people have only a 
superficial awareness that smoking is dangerous.”112 
As the court noted, the problems with the current warnings alone were not 
enough to satisfy the rational-basis standard.113 The government must show a 
rational connection between the warnings’ purpose and the means used to 
achieve that purpose.114 The court applies the relatively low standard set forth 
in Sorrell, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
upheld a law requiring certain products to bear a warning label disclosing the 
mercury content.115 The court in Sorrell found that the required disclosure 
satisfied the rational-basis standard simply upon concluding that “[i]t is 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 563. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 563. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 539. 
 110. Id. at 563. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 563 (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 449 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 578 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
 113. Id. at 564. 
 114. Id. at 561. 
 115. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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probable that some mercury lamp purchasers, newly informed by the Vermont 
label, will properly dispose of [the lamps] and thereby reduce mercury 
pollution.”116 The Sixth Circuit noted that the decision in Sorrell did not point 
to any evidence that the required disclosure would, in fact, change the behavior 
of any consumers, but simply relied on “common sense.”117 Thus, the court 
similarly assumed that it is probable, based on common sense, that the graphic 
warning requirements would influence some consumers not to purchase 
tobacco products.118 
Ironically, the court actually used the plaintiffs’ own argument to support 
its “common sense” assumption.119 In arguing against the Act’s ban on color 
and graphics in tobacco advertisements, the plaintiffs asserted that such a 
prohibition would inhibit their ability to “effectively communicate with adult 
tobacco consumers using advertising that captures their attention.”120 The 
plaintiffs further admitted at oral argument that “color and imagery are the 
most effective way to get your ad noticed and communicate a message.”121 
Therefore, the court held that the warnings were reasonably related to 
promoting greater public understanding of the health risks associated with 
tobacco use.122 
B. D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Warnings in R.J. Reynolds 
After the FDA published its final rule releasing the nine required graphic 
images in June, 2011,123 the “Big Five” tobacco companies, most of whom 
were plaintiffs in Discount Tobacco, again filed suit against the FDA.124 This 
time, rather than facially challenging the constitutionality of the warnings 
requirement, they challenged the FDA’s promulgation of the specific graphic 
warning labels incorporating textual warnings and the corresponding “1-800-
QUIT-NOW” hotline number.125 
In striking down the Act, the court first held that a more stringent 
intermediate scrutiny standard rather that the Zauderer rational-basis standard 
applied.126 Second, the court found that the government did not produce a 
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“shred of evidence” to show that the graphic warnings would directly advance 
its interest in reducing smoking rates.127 
1. Application of the Central Hudson Intermediate Scrutiny Standard128 
The court applied the same two-part test as in Discount Tobacco to 
determine whether the Zauderer rational-basis standard applied, but came to 
opposite conclusions on both prongs. The court concluded that, contrary to the 
decision in Discount Tobacco, there was no evidence that the current cigarette 
packages were deceiving.129 Thus, the graphic warnings could not be shown to 
meet the first requirement established in Zauderer130—that is, that the 
disclosure requirements are aimed at “preventing deception of consumers.”131 
The court also ruled contrary to Discount Tobacco in finding that the 
graphic warnings were not “purely factual and uncontroversial.”132 These 
opposing conclusions, however, may be reconcilable based on the fact that in 
Discount Tobacco, the court dealt with a facial challenge to the statute, and did 
not consider the specific graphic images later released by the FDA. Thus, in 
Discount Tobacco, the court held only that there could be graphic images that 
were purely factual in nature.133 Here, however, the court found that the actual 
graphic images released by the FDA were not purely factual.134 Rather, the 
court considered the images to be “unabashed attempts to evoke emotion . . . 
and browbeat consumers into quitting.”135 The D.C. Circuit offered examples 
of the images that do not convey any factual information, including images of 
a woman crying, a small child, and a man wearing a t-shirt declaring “I 
QUIT.”136 
Because the court found the required warnings to be neither factual nor 
necessary to prevent deception, it determined that the Zauderer standard did 
not apply.137 However, it disagreed with the district court’s application of a 
strict scrutiny standard because “commercial speech receives a lower level of 
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protection under the First Amendment.”138 The court therefore applied the 
intermediate standard set forth in Central Hudson.139 
2. Warnings do not Survive Intermediate Scrutiny 
Under the intermediate standard set forth in Central Hudson, the 
government must first show that its asserted interest is substantial.140 If so, then 
a court must next determine whether the regulation directly advances that 
interest, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to do so.141 The 
government bears the burden of proving each element, and as the R.J. Reynolds 
court noted, this burden “is not light.”142 
The court considered the government’s asserted interest to be reducing 
smoking rates.143 Unlike the court in Discount Tobacco, which considered the 
more general purpose of promoting greater understanding of health risks 
associated with smoking, the court here found that this “describes only the 
means by which FDA is attempting to reduce smoking rates.”144 Thus, the 
government faced the much heavier burden of producing evidence that the 
warnings would directly lower smoking rates. 
The court concluded, however, that the government did not produce a 
“shred” of such evidence.145 The FDA produced substantial evidence regarding 
the adoption of similar graphic warnings in Canada and Australia, along with 
studies suggesting that such warnings contributed to a reduction in smoking 
rates.146 However, the court found that such studies were too speculative and 
failed to take into account other factors affecting the smoking rates.147 
Judge Rogers, writing for the dissent, concluded not only that the less 
stringent Zauderer standard applied, but also that the new warnings would 
survive under either level of scrutiny.148 In concluding that the Zauderer 
standard applied, Judge Rogers first found that the warnings were aimed at 
preventing the deception of consumers.149 The dissent compared this case to 
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, in which the court 
upheld, under the Zauderer standard, a rule requiring airlines to list the total 
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price as the most prominent number displayed.150 The Spirit Airlines court held 
that it was “deceitful and misleading when the most prominent price listed by 
an airline is anything other than the total, final price of air travel.”151 The 
dissent here applied the same logic to conclude that cigarette packages that 
“fail to display the final costs of smoking in a prominent manner are at least as 
misleading as the airline advertisements in Spirit Airlines.”152 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority in finding that the warnings 
were factual in nature.153 Unlike the majority, which seemed to define “purely 
factual” information as information that carries no emotional response,154 the 
dissent based this distinction simply on whether the information is accurate, 
noting that the “emotive quality of the selected images does not necessarily 
undermine the warnings’ factual accuracy.”155 
In addition to applying the less stringent Zauderer standard, the dissent 
also considered the FDA’s broader interest in promoting greater public 
understanding of the health risk associated with smoking.156 While the majority 
dismissed this stated interest as “too vague to stand on its own,”157 the dissent 
reasoned that in light of the serious public health consequences of smoking, the 
government’s interest in effective communication about such consequences 
“take[s] on added importance.”158 Unlike the majority, which pointed to the 
government’s failure to produce a “shred of evidence,”159 the dissent found 
that the government produced “substantial evidence” that the warnings would 
survive under not only the Zauderer rational-basis standard, but also under the 
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.160 
IV.  RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Should the U.S. Supreme Court decide to resolve the circuit split, it must 
first decide which of the three standards discussed—Zauderer’s rational-basis 
standard, Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard, or strict scrutiny—
correctly applies to the warnings. Part A explains why the Court should apply 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny to the warnings requirements. Part B 
then analyzes the warnings under both Central Hudson and Zauderer. 
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A. Intermediate Scrutiny Should Apply 
In order to evaluate the warnings as a whole, including the textual 
statements, graphic images, and reference to “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” the U.S. 
Supreme Court should apply Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny 
standard.161 
The Zauderer standard is not applicable for two reasons. First, the standard 
only applies to disclosures that convey “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
information.162 While the textual warnings certainly meet this requirement, 
some of the accompanying graphic images do not. In support of the images, the 
FDA itself cited research suggesting that “risk information is most readily 
communicated by messages that arouse emotional reactions” and that 
“warnings that generate an immediate emotional response from viewers can 
confer negative feelings about smoking and undermine the appeal and 
attractiveness of smoking.”163 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “[f]acts can 
disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark controversy, and 
even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into 
opinions.”164 Although the fact that the images are intended to provoke an 
emotional response does not necessarily defeat their factual nature, some of the 
images do not convey factual information at all. For example, the photographs 
of a healthy lung next to a smoker’s lung and a man with a tracheotomy are 
purely factual in nature. Both photographs accurately convey common health 
consequences of smoking. However, the images of a woman crying, a cartoon 
drawing of a hospitalized baby, and a man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt do not 
convey “factual and uncontroversial” information about the adverse health 
effects of smoking. Therefore, these specific images do not meet the first prong 
of Zauderer. 
Second, none of the graphic images meet the second requirement of 
Zauderer because they are not aimed specifically at preventing consumer 
deception. The FDA stated that the purpose of the warnings was to reduce 
smoking among youth by promoting a greater understanding of the health risks 
associated with smoking.165 In finding that the warnings were aimed at 
preventing deception, the Sixth Circuit pointed to the “decades-long 
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deception” by tobacco companies.166 Citing United States v. Philip Morris 
USA Inc.,167 the court noted that tobacco companies “knowingly and actively 
conspired to deceive the public about the health risks and addictiveness of 
smoking for decades.”168 While this historical deception by tobacco companies 
provides strong policy support for the graphic warnings, it is not relevant in 
determining whether Zauderer applies. Zauderer explicitly applies to 
disclosures that are reasonably related to “preventing consumer deception,”169 
not balancing the effects of past deception. The FDA presented no evidence 
suggesting that the current textual warnings are deceiving, just that they are not 
effective.170 Thus, Zauderer does not apply. 
Strict scrutiny also does not apply. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 
Central Hudson, “[t]he Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”171 
Therefore, as noted in R.J. Reynolds, “burdens imposed on [commercial 
speech] receive a lower level of scrutiny from the courts.”172 Both circuits were 
therefore correct in rejecting the application of strict scrutiny. Because the 
warnings involve compelled commercial speech, Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny standard for regulations on commercial speech applies. 
B. Analysis Under Central Hudson and Zauderer 
1. Central Hudson’s Intermediate Scrutiny Standard 
Under Central Hudson, a court must first determine whether the asserted 
government interest is substantial.173 A key distinction between the Sixth and 
D.C. Circuits’ analyses was the “government interest” under which the 
warnings were analyzed. The Sixth Circuit analyzed the warnings under the 
government’s stated interest in “promoting greater public understanding of the 
risks” associated with smoking,174 while the D.C. Circuit analyzed the 
warnings under the government’s interest in directly reducing smoking rates.175 
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The latter interest imposes a significantly high burden on the government to 
prove that the warnings will directly advance that interest. Under the first 
interest, the government would satisfy its burden by providing evidence 
showing that more people will notice, read, and understand the warnings. 
Under the second interest, however, the government would only satisfy the 
burden by providing direct evidence that the warnings will in fact cause people 
to quit smoking, which, as explained below, is impossible to prove. Thus, the 
government interest considered by the Court would likely determine the 
outcome of the case. 
The warnings should be analyzed under the government’s stated interest in 
“promoting greater public understanding of the risks” associated with 
smoking.176 The D.C. Circuit viewed this interest as describing “only the 
means by which FDA is attempting to reduce smoking rates,” which it 
considered to be “too vague to stand on its own.”177 However, the fact that 
effectively conveying information describes a means of lowering smoking 
rates does not necessarily make it too vague. Under this same logic, reducing 
smoking rates could be characterized as simply describing a means of 
improving the health of American citizens. Given the substantial interest of the 
government in reducing smoking among youth, effective communication of the 
dangers of smoking is simply a more narrowly defined interest that should not 
be dismissed as “too vague.”178 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit failed to take 
into account the impossibility of providing direct evidence to prove that these 
warnings would directly reduce smoking rates. Because the warnings have not 
yet been put into effect, any statistical predictions would necessarily be 
speculative. As the court itself noted, many factors determine a person’s 
decision to smoke,179 and it would be impossible to isolate the effect of new 
warnings on a person’s decision to quit or decline to start smoking. Therefore, 
the Court should analyze the more narrowly focused interest in promoting 
greater public understanding of the negative health consequences of smoking. 
The government’s interest in reducing smoking rates, particularly among 
youth, by more effectively communicating the health risks associated with 
smoking is clearly a substantial interest. Smoking remains the nation’s largest 
public health problem.180 Tobacco use claims the lives of 440,000 Americans 
every year.181 Smoking accounts for more deaths than AIDS, alcohol use, 
cocaine use, heroin use, homicides, suicides, car accidents, and fires 
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combined.182 Smoking is the leading cause of preventable death in the United 
States, and more than eighty percent of smokers have their first cigarette before 
turning eighteen.183 Almost half (46.3%) of young Americans in grades nine 
through twelve have tried smoking, and 19.5% are current smokers.184 
Smoking also involves a high risk of lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, 
and pregnancy complications.185 The current warnings have been proven to go 
largely unnoticed and fail to effectively convey the dangers of smoking, 
especially to youth.186 
In addition to the many serious health consequences of smoking, it is also 
important to note that tobacco use has taken an economic toll on America.187 
Health care expenditures for smoking-related conditions are estimated to be 
around eighty-nine billion dollars each year.188 Lost work productivity as a 
result of death from tobacco use totals more than ninety-two billion dollars 
annually.189 The government has a substantial interest in promoting public 
understanding of these risks in order to (1) protect the health of Americans and 
(2) lower the nation’s health care costs associated with smoking. 
Second, to survive intermediate scrutiny, the warning requirements must 
directly advance the government’s interest in promoting greater public 
understanding of the health risks of smoking.190 The FDA presented extensive 
evidence that the current textual warnings are ineffective and go largely 
unnoticed, especially by adolescents.191 One study of adolescents viewing 
tobacco advertisements showed that 63.3% of the adolescents did not even 
view the warning long enough to read any of its words, and most of the 
adolescents were unable to recall the warning or even recognize it from a 
list.192 Another study found that 85% of Canadian smokers cited cigarette 
packages (which, in Canada, require prominent pictorial warnings) as a source 
of health information, while only 47% of American smokers cited packages as 
a source of health information.193 Furthermore, another study showed that 
participants voluntarily viewed the graphic warnings on Canadian packages for 
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longer periods of time than the textual warnings in the United States.194 
Finally, the FDA cited research suggesting that graphic warning labels are (1) 
more likely to be noticed than text-only warnings, (2) more effective at 
conveying the health risks associated with smoking, and (3) associated with 
increased motivation to quit smoking.195 
Another key problem with the current textual warnings is that viewers 
must have a relatively high reading level in order to understand the 
warnings.196 The warnings “require a college reading level”197 and are 
therefore ineffective at conveying information to many young Americans, 
adults with low education levels or reading disabilities, and those for whom 
English is not their first language. Smoking rates are higher among adults with 
low education levels.198 For example, 49.1% of adults with a General 
Education Development certificate and 28.5% of adults with less than a high 
school diploma were current smokers in 2009, compared with 5.6% of adults 
with a graduate degree.199 As the FDA noted, graphic warnings would provide 
a “particularly important communication tool” for these individuals, as 
evidence suggests that countries with graphic health warnings show fewer 
disparities in health knowledge across educational levels.200 
Finally, Central Hudson requires that the warnings must not be more 
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest.201 Some would 
argue that the government could pursue other options to promote 
understanding of the health risks associated with tobacco, such as an 
advertising campaign. However, unlike the warning labels, no advertising 
campaign is guaranteed to reach every teenager at the moment they are 
considering whether to purchase their first package of cigarettes. As the FDA 
has shown, the only way to more effectively capture the attention of this 
critical viewer at the most critical time is to include graphic, color images on 
every cigarette package.202 Therefore, the graphic warning labels should be 
upheld under Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard. 
2. Zauderer’s Rational Basis Standard 
Although unlikely, the U.S. Supreme Court could agree with the Sixth 
Circuit in finding that Zauderer applies. This would require the Court to find 
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the graphic images to be both factual in nature and intended to prevent 
deception by balancing the effects of the “decades-long deception” by the 
tobacco industry.203 Since the Court would already have equated “preventing 
deception” with balancing past deception in order for Zauderer to apply, the 
government would bear the much lower burden of proving that the graphic 
images are “reasonably related” to balancing the past deception of tobacco 
companies.204 The use of color images to more effectively capture consumers’ 
attention would certainly help to balance out the “decades-long” deception by 
tobacco companies.205 
It is also possible that the Court could analyze the images individually 
under Zauderer, upholding only those images that it determines to be “purely 
factual and uncontroversial.”206 Many of the images factually portray the 
effects of smoking, including the photograph of a man blowing smoke out of 
the tracheotomy hole in his throat, the photograph of decaying teeth and 
lesions caused by mouth cancer, and the photographs of a healthy lung next to 
a smoker’s lung. These images, paired together with the accompanying textual 
warnings, essentially convey the factual message that “this is a common 
consequence of smoking.” However, it is hard to imagine that some of the 
other images could be found to convey “purely factual” information. For 
example, the cartoon image of a baby in a hospital, the photograph of a woman 
crying, and the picture of man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt do not convey factual 
information about the dangers of smoking. Thus, it is possible that the Court 
could uphold only some of the FDA’s images under the Zauderer standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States was the first country to introduce tobacco warning 
labels, and now, ironically, it requires one of the least prominent warnings 
compared to other countries. Extensive research shows that the current textual 
warnings go largely ignored and unnoticed, and that prominent, colorful 
images are necessary to more effectively communicate the health risks 
associated with smoking. Given that smoking remains the leading cause of 
preventable death in the United States and that most smokers have their first 
cigarette before the legal age of eighteen, the government certainly has a 
substantial interest in promoting public awareness of the serious health risks 
associated with smoking. As substantial evidence shows, graphic color images 
are the only way to more effectively capture the attention of American 
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adolescents at the time they pick up their first package of cigarettes. Therefore, 
the U.S. Supreme Court should break away from the historical influence and 
deception of tobacco companies and uphold the new graphic warning labels as 
constitutional under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard. 
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